Airpower : Myths and Facts

By Phillip S. Meilinger

Book Id: WPLBN0002170386
Format Type: PDF eBook:
File Size: 0.9 MB
Reproduction Date: 10/15/2012

Title:	Airpower : Myths and Facts
Author:	Phillip S. Meilinger
Volume:
Language:	English
Subject:	Non Fiction, Military Science, Airpower
Collections:	Technology, Science Fiction Collection, Business Strategy, Leadership, Military Science, Authors Community, Chemistry, Naval Science, Political Sociology, Literature, Sociology, Favorites in India, Most Popular Books in China, Language, History, Political Science
Historic Publication Date:
Publisher:	Air University Press

Member Page:	Air University Press
Citation APA MLA Chicago S. Meilinge, B. P. (n.d.). Airpower : Myths and Facts. Retrieved from http://self.gutenberg.org/

Description
What follows are points and counterpoints that attempt to clear away some of the detritus that obscures the subject, thus allowing more informed debate on the real issues concerning airpower and strategic bombing. This in turn, hopefully, will give our political and military leaders a better basis on which to form decisions in future conflicts.

Table of Contents
1 Between the world wars, even though the US Army Air Corps received more than its fair share of funds from the Army, it continued to complain, agitate, and ask for more. . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13 2 Entering World War II, the Air Corps’s unbalanced doctrine and force structure leaned too heavily towards strategic bombing. Thus, air support of ground forces was inadequate and largely ignored by airmen. . . . . 17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 The Air Corps entered World War II with a “Douhetian” concept of air war that emphasized area bombing and the waging of war on women and children. . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29 4 Airmen thought they could win the war alone. . . . . . 31 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36 5 The fact that German production, especially of aircraft, continued to increase throughout 1944 proves that the Combined Bomber Offensive (CBO) was ineffective and that the resources devoted to it would have been better spent elsewhere. . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 45 6 Bombing was ineffective because it actually stiffened rather than lowered enemy morale. . . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 50 7 The atomic bombs were unnecessary because Japan was about to surrender; even if it had not given up, an invasion or continued blockade would have been more humane. . . . . . . . . . 53 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 8 Overall, strategic bombing was a wasted effort that produced only minor effects. . . . .63 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69 9 Airpower was a failure in Vietnam, losing the war and letting the Army down. Why even have an Air Force if it can’t beat a fourth-rate power like North Vietnam?. . . . . . . . . . . . 73 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 81 10 Strategic bombing failed in Vietnam because Rolling Thunder did not break the will of Ho Chi Minh and his cohorts to continue the war in the south. . . . . . . . . . 85 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 90 11 Airpower was an indiscriminate weapon that killed excessive numbers of Vietnamese civilians. . . . . . . 93 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 96 12 Too focused on strategic attack during the Persian Gulf War, the Air Force provided inadequate support to ground forces. . . . . . . . . . . 99 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 107 13 Air attack is nothing more than “recreational bombing”; pilots fly so high they can’t possibly hit their targets accurately. . . . . . . . . 109 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 113 14 Despite all the talk by airmen, the employment of airpower remains an indiscriminate use of military force that deliberately targets civilians. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 121 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 125