Green and Blue in the Wild Blue : An Examination of the Evolution of Army and Air Force Airpower Thinking and Doctrine since the Vietnam War

By Major Robert J. Hamilton

Book Id: WPLBN0002170715
Format Type: PDF eBook:
File Size: 0.6 MB
Reproduction Date: 10/22/2012

Title:	Green and Blue in the Wild Blue : An Examination of the Evolution of Army and Air Force Airpower Thinking and Doctrine since the Vietnam War
Author:	Major Robert J. Hamilton
Volume:
Language:	English
Subject:	Non Fiction, Military Science, Airpower
Collections:	Authors Community, United States
Historic Publication Date:
Publisher:	Air University Press

Member Page:	Air University Press
Citation APA MLA Chicago Robert J. Hamilto, B. M. (n.d.). Green and Blue in the Wild Blue : An Examination of the Evolution of Army and Air Force Airpower Thinking and Doctrine since the Vietnam War. Retrieved from http://self.gutenberg.org/

Description
During the Lebanon conflict, the IAF employed the most advanced combat aircraft in the world to attack targets in southern Lebanon in an effort to compel the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) and Shi’ite forces to reduce the frequency of guerrilla attacks against Israeli ground troops. This thesis evaluates the effectiveness of those air raids in supporting the Israeli coercive strategy. This study contends there were two reasons for this failure. First, the asymmetry of motivation favored the Shi’ites, which negated the effectiveness of air strikes as a“carrot.” Second, the air strikes were unable to create a realistic fear of escalation for the targets. This was caused by two factors: the Lebanese environment and the inability of the air strikes to add significantly to the costs of the target organizations. This paper finds that Army and Air Force airpower theory and doctrine have converged at the operational level of warfare. The kernel of a future airpower theory may be found in two propositions. The first is the general agreement between the Army and the Air Force that airpower can provide important, potentially decisive capabilities throughout a theater of operations when centrally controlled. The second proposition is found in the realization by the Air Force that distinctions between strategic and tactical airpower are artificial and limiting. The corollary to the second proposition is that the relative effectiveness of a particular airpower role or mission is situationally dependent.