Description Details
The author contends that urban terrain has become the preferred battlespace of US adversaries in the early twenty-first century. This environment poses unique challenges, especially to air and space warfare. The difficulty of sorting friendlies from enemy combatants, the latter intermingled with large numbers of noncombatants in very confined spaces, creates serious dilemmas for maneuver and aviation forces. Colonel Kemper believes that this mission, though well documented, has received neither the priority nor the resources necessary to ensure operational excellence and success on the modern battlefield. Thus, he not only inquires about whether we are training like we fight, but also seeks to determine what makes aviation urban operations so complicated and unique that they require stand-alone doctrine, tactics, techniques, and procedures....

Description Details
The author's contention is that training for night air operations, particularly with our sister services, is in its infancy. Using his personal experience he sets out to recommend better uses of the training facilities of all the services to improve the situation . After examining the history of joint operations and night air operations, presenting a hypothetical joint night scenario to show the tremendous challenges of such operations, and describing the current status of joint night training programs, the author recommends a phased building-block approach that should increase the Air Force's capability to perform both single-service and joint operations any time of the day or night. This will ensure that we train as we plan to fight in future air operations....

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1 HISTORY AND BACKGROUND . . . . . . . . . . 1 Joint Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Night Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 2 DOING IT IN THE DARK THE CHALLENGE . . 17 Operation Tae Kwon Do . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .19 Mission Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22 Offensive Counterair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .23 Defensive Counterair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34 On-Call Close Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . .35 Mission Execution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 Offensive Counterair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .38 Defensive Counterair . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 On-Call Close Air Support . . . . . . . . . . . . .48 Mission Feasibility . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 51 Summary . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .53 PHOTO SECTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 3 CURRENT TRAINING PROGRAMS . . . . . . . 61 Requirements for Re...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 2 EDUCATION, TRAINING, AND EXPERIENCE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11 3 LEADERSHIP COMPETENCIES . . . . . . . . . .13 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 4 LEADERSHIP ACTIONS: THE HUMP AIRLIFT OPERATION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38 5 LEADERSHIP ACTIONS: THE BERLIN AIRLIFT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 6 SUMMARY AND CRITIQUE . . . . . . . . . . . .57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 65 Illustrations Figure Page 1 Air Force Leadership Framework (Proposed) . . . . . . . . . ...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi 1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .9 2 DISENGAGEMENT IN STRATEGY . . . . . . . . .11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23 3 DISENGAGEMENT IN THE COLD WAR . . . . .25 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 4 DISENGAGEMENT IN THE NEW WORLD ORDER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 80 5 REFRAMING DISENGAGEMENT . . . . . . . . . .83 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 97 6 EFFECTS OF BARRIERS . . . . . . . . . . . . . .99 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 115 7 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 117 Note . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .121 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .123 Illustrations Figure 1 P...

Description Details
The purpose of The Role of Rhetorical Theory in Military Intelligence Analysis is to share Major Mills’s rhetorical understanding with young officers attending initial intelligence training. Throughout he infuses key elements from the rhetorical discourse community into the discourse community that deals with training in military intelligence....

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1 INTRODUCTION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 2 LET’S GET RHETORICAL . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 3 INTELLIGENCE PROCESS . . . . . . . . . . . . .11 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19 4 WHAT THE FOUCAULT? . . . . . . . . . . . . . .21 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .26 5 POWER PLUG . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37 6 DISCONTINUITY FEVER . . . . . . . . . . . . . .39 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 46 7 IN THE TRENCHES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 47 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 54 8 CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 55 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 59 INDEX . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 63...

Description Details
This British historian, David Hall, found relevant cross-service problems in Afghanistan during recent British air-ground operations. He was stricken by the similarities with British airground operations during World War II when the Royal Air Force and the British Army first struggled with doctrinal air support practices....

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .vii SUMMARY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix ACKNOWLEDGMENTS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .xi LEARNING HOW TO FIGHT TOGETHER: THE BRITISH EXPERIENCE WITH JOINT AIR-LAND WARFARE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Origins of the Air-Land Debate . . . . . . . . . . 5 Political Wrangling between the Independent Air Force and Army/Royal Air Force during the Interwar Years . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 The Battle for France, 1940 . . . . . . . . . . . 10 The Evolution of Air-Land Technique . . . . . .11 North Africa: The Adoption and Refinement of a New Air-Land Technique . . . . . . . . . . . 14 Success without Harmony: British Air-Land Co-operation by the End of the War . . . . . .25 Back to Afghanistan and Contemporary Air-Land Integration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .27 Enduring Themes and Contemporary Relevance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .29 NOTES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ....

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Fifth Air Force light and medium bomber operations during 1942 and 1943 are textbook examples of doctrinal flexibility and extraordinary innovation. The unprecedented success of both the Battle of the Bismarck Sea and the Wewak Raid illustrate how airpower became the dominant force in the Southwest Pacific....

Description Details
A huge portion of the military burden in support of these operations falls on the shoulders of the Mobility Air Forces (MAF). Lt Col Eileen M. Isola’s Leading Air Mobility Operations in Complex Humanitarian Emergencies provides just such an educational foundation for MAF war fighters charged with leading CHEs. She provides a superb synthesis of a dozen years of lessons learned from many resources and institutions, sifting through the tactical and operational lessons learned so as to focus her research into the most important tenets for strategic success in a CHE: build a team of teams, gather and share information (not “intelligence”), and establish centers for interagency success. She reviews key joint and service doctrine manuals, culling critical nuances that would likely be overlooked by war fighters new to the CHE environment, or rushed in a crisis deployment. Her cultural comparison of the military and nongovernmental organizations is insightful and valuable. Throughout her work Colonel Isola provides tangible, real examples from past operations of what worked and what did not—and why. The implications for the future are clear...

Description Details
Wills argues that the twentieth-century argument between air and ground proponents has changed significantly since the Gulf War, and it comes down to the relative importance of the ground or air in the mix. It is more than just using air as a supporting component to the ground forces—if this is true, current force organization and employment is adequate. However, if the air predominates in combat operations, then, as Wills puts it in his first chapter, joint operations doctrine needs to be rethought. A changed balance “will affect the military at every level . . . force structure, organization, weapons acquisition, doctrine, and training” (p. 3). Notwithstanding the blunt commentary from ground proponents, Wills offers that airpower has come to dominate air/ground relations....

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1 FRAMING THE DEBATE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7 2 AIRPOWER, WAR, AND DIPLOMACY . . . . . 9 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .16 3 ASSESSING THE AIR/GROUND RELATIONSHIP . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .17 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 4 THE AFGHAN MODEL AND BEYOND . . . . . .35 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .52 5 IMPLICATIONS . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 57 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .66 BIBLIOGRAPHY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 69...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .v Theory of War . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .1 Patriotism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .8 Air, Space , and Cyber Power . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Doctrine . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 Education , Training, and Lessons Learned . 24 Preparedness , Security, and Force Protection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Planning . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .30 Leadership and Professionalism . . . . . . . 32 Character and Leadership Traits . . . . . . 35 Technology . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 39 Logistics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 42 Intelligence, Surveillance , and Reconnaissance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .45 Unmanned Aerial Vehicles . . . . . . . . . . . . 48 Information and Communication S . . . . . . 49 Joint Perspectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 52 Coalition Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .55 Airpower at War . . . . . . . . . . . ...

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DISCLAIMER . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ii FOREWORD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . vii ABOUT THE AUTHOR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ix PREFACE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . xi 1 PREPARING TO TALK . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1 Types of Speaking . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Briefing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .2 Teaching Lecture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2 Speech . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Audience . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3 Audience Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Audience Attitude . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .5 Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .6 Selecting the Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6 Narrowing the Subject . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Choosing a Title . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8 Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 General Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Specific Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9 Gathering Material . . . . . . . . . . ....

Description Details
This study analyzes and assesses the changes in organization and structure of the active Air Force and ANG fighter maintenance units from the time the ANG became a separate reserve component in 1946 to the present-day organization, paralleling it with the active Air Force. It takes the reader from the ANG maintenance unit's beginning, through the changes that occurred over the years and the reason for the changes, to the present day organization. It then provides a glimpse at the future maintenance organization....

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1 AIRCRAFT MAINTENANCE: PAST AND PRESENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .I Centralized Control, 1930-45 . . . . . . . . . . . 4 Period of Uncertainty, 1945-55 . . . . . . . . . . 5 Return to Centralization, 1955-70 . . . . . . . . 7 Decentralized Control, 1970 to the Present . .8 Lessons Learned . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10 Current Organization Structure Theory : A Review . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .12 Air Force and Major Command Policy Guidance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15 Notes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21 2 THE AIR NATIONAL GUARD MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION AND THE COMBAT ORIENTED MAINTENANCE ORGANIZATION . . . . . . . . . . 23 The Centralized Organization . . . . . . . . . . .23 Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24 Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .25 The Decentralized Organization . . . . . . . . .26 Strengths . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 Weaknesses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27 The Air National Guard . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . ...